A Security and Performance Driven Architecture for Cloud Data Centers by Felemban, Muhamad et al.
1A Security and Performance Driven Architecture for
Cloud Data Centers
Muhamad Felemban, Anas Daghistani, Yahya Javed, Jason Kobes, and Arif Ghafoor
ABSTRACT
With the growing cyber-security threats, ensuring the se-
curity of data in Cloud data centers is a challenging task.
A prominent type of attack on Cloud data centers is data
tampering attack that can jeopardize the confidentiality and the
integrity of data. In this article, we present a security and per-
formance driven architecture for these centers that incorporates
an intrusion management system for multi-tenant distributed
transactional databases. The proposed architecture uses a novel
data partitioning and placement scheme based on damage
containment and communication cost of distributed transac-
tions. In addition, we present a benchmarking framework for
evaluating the performance of the proposed architecture. The
results illustrate a trade-off between security and performance
goals for Cloud data centers.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth of data volume driven by IoT, social
networks, and other data-intensive applications poses numer-
ous performance and security challenges in terms of real-
time data stores and processing [1]. Cloud computing has
emerged as a leading infrastructure that provides a pay-per-
use access to a shared pool of resources. Numerous research
efforts have aimed at designing scalable Cloud Data Centers
(CDCs) for hosting multi-tenant applications [2]. Figure 1(a)
depicts the conventional three layered architecture of a CDC.
These layers include: Application, Platform, and Infrastructure
layer. The application layer provides access to various services
to the end-user. The platform layer consists of operating
systems and software frameworks including database systems
for supporting Cloud applications. The infrastructure layer
consists of shared physical resources, e.g., CPUs, memory,
and data storage.
One of the main challenges in designing transactional
databases for CDCs is the partitioning and placement of
tenants data across a cluster of data stores. Efficient solution
to this problem can result in an increase in the availability
and reliability of the CDC [3], [2]. This is especially true
for multi-tenant applications that may serve large volume of
transactions. An example of a transactional database designed
for Cloud environments is ElasTras [4]. Figure 1(b) depicts
the architecture of a typical distributed transactional database,
which consists of three components: a distributed transactions
manger (DTM), a transactions router, and a data partition
manger. The DTM is responsible for managing the commit
protocol of the distributed sub-transactions. The transaction
router maps each sub-transaction to an appropriate database
that contains the required data. The partition manger is
responsible of managing the distributed storage solutions,
e.g., Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS), by creating
and placing the partitions across the distributed data store.
Several solutions have been proposed to address the problem
of data partitioning and placement for distributed Cloud data
stores. These solutions are primarily focused on achieving
various performance criteria such as latency and transaction
throughput. [3], [5].
On the other hand, the multi-tenancy feature provided by a
Cloud infrastructure poses unique security risks due to data
leakage, virtual machine escape, and side channel attacks.
Such risks arise from sharing of physical resources among
tenants. Another prominent intrusion attack in transactional
databases is the data tampering attack that aims at modifying
confidential data with incorrect values [6]. Due to multi-
tenancy feature of CDCs, a data tampering attack can cause
catastrophic cascading failures and performance degradation as
a result of application interoperability, data dependency, and
data sharing among tenants. Such attacks can be manifested
by exploiting vulnerabilities in the application, e.g., SQL
injection, privilege escalation, and virtual machine escape.
Table I lists some known Cloud vulnerabilities along with their
scores as stipulated by the Common Vulnerability Scoring Sys-
tem (CVSS)1. Exploitation of these vulnerabilities constitutes
data tampering attacks in CDCs. Several solutions have been
proposed to address the risk of data leakage including data
isolation and enforcement of some access control mechanisms
[7]. However, no solution has been proposed to mitigate the
risk of intrusion attacks on transactional databases for CDC.
In this article, we propose a security-driven architecture
for transactional database for CDCs. Development of this
architecture entails reengineering the CDC architecture by
including a real-time Adaptive Intrusion Management Sys-
tem (AIMS) that provides intrusion detection, response and
recovery mechanisms for the database. AIMS uses an adaptive
access and admission control mechanism that responds to
intrusion attacks by selectively blocking segments of data that
are affected by these attacks. Intrusion attacks are manifested
in the form of malicious transactions. The proposed archi-
tecture uses a security-driven and performance-oriented data
partitioning and placement strategy across Cloud data stores.
We model the data partitioning and placement requirement
as an optimization problem with combined performance and
security objectives. In addition, we present a novel malicious
transaction benchmark for AIMS to illustrate its resiliency
1https://www.first.org/cvss/
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2TABLE I: Example of vulnerabilities in CDCs.
Vulnerability CVSS
Score
Description
CVE-2017-7546 9.8 PostgreSQL vulnerability that allows adversary to gain access to database with empty
password
CVE-2018-1058 8.8 PostgreSQL vulnerability that allows adversary to execute codes in with the permissions
of superuser
CVE-2015-7502 5.1 Operating systems vulnerability that allows adversary to obtain sensitive data and gain
privilege
CVE-2018-5985 9.8 SQL injection vulnerability in LiveCRM SaaS cloud component
CVE-2016-9994 7.1 SQL injection vulnerability in IBM Cloud
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Fig. 1: CDC and distributed transactional database architec-
tures.
against various attack scenarios. We present the evaluation
results to highlight the viability of the proposed architecture
and illustrate a trade-off between security and performance in
the context of reengineering CDCs.
II. RELATED WORK
Several solutions have been proposed to prevent and miti-
gate the effect of intrusion attacks on transactional databases.
One solution is to employ an Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
with the objective of an IDS is to monitor and detect illegal
accesses and malicious actions in transactional databases [8],
[9]. However, an IDS can miss the detection of an attacks and
is not designed to repair the damage caused by late detection
of attacks. Therefore, an IDS is often integrated with response
and recovery mechanisms to alleviate the damage [10]. In
[11], a mechanism to recover from intrusion attacks for web-
applications by rolling back the database and replaying subse-
quent legitimate actions to correct the state of the database is
proposed. In [12], the authors propose an intrusion recovery
tool for database-driven applications running on Platform-
as-a-Service Clouds. AIMS can be used as a middle-layer
between the transactional database and the application to
perform automatic intrusion response and recovery indepen-
dently from the running applications. The most relevant work
close to AIMS is given in [13], [10] that proposes an online
damage tracking and quarantine mechanism to increase the
survivability of single-tenant databases. The authors propose a
multi-pass recovery procedure to ensure that all the corrupted
data objects are recovered. However, in scenarios with high
dependency among transactions in a workload, the recovery
procedure can take a long time and hence can degrade the
overall performance. AIMS employs an admission control
mechanism that momentarily suspends running transactions
and performs the recovery procedure in a single-pass.
Previous work on data partitioning and placement has been
focused on improving the availability, reliability, and scalabil-
ity, but not on the security aspect of shared-nothing distributed
transactional databases. For example, in [14] authors study
the problem of data placement strategies that minimize the
data communication cost incurred by distributing data across
clusters of servers. In [5], authors propose an automatic data
partitioning methodology for distributed transactional memory
systems. In [3], authors propose a partitioning and place-
ment technique across large number of machines in order to
minimize the number of distributed transactions. However, in
this article the proposed architecture of CDC addresses the
challenge of data partitioning and placement with respect to
both performance and security considerations.
III. SECURITY-DRIVEN REENGINEERING DESIGN OF
CLOUD DATA CENTER
Figure 2(a) depicts a generic architecture of AIMS, which
provides intrusion detection, response and recovery mecha-
nisms for the database. In the following we briefly elaborate
these mechanisms. Subsequently, in order to reengineer the
design of the CDC architecture in Figure 1(b), we integrate
AIMS functionalities in this architecture. The integration en-
tails the identification of new components and possible re-
designing some of the existing components of Figure 1(b).
In Figure 2(b) the integrated architecture of CDC is depicted.
This architecture provides a security-driven and performance-
oriented data partitioning and placement, and distributed in-
trusion management across cluster of servers for CDC. Dis-
cussion on AIMS and each component of the new architecture
is given in the following sections.
A. Adaptive Intrusion Management System
The objective of AIMS is to mitigate the damage caused
by intrusion attacks on transactional databases. We consider
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Fig. 2: Reengineering CDC by integrating AIMS with the
distributed transactional database architecture.
transaction-level intrusion attacks on the database. A transac-
tion, tm, is malicious if it tampers the database by updating
data objects with incorrect values. In this context, a malicious
transaction corrupts the data by launching an attack. A trans-
action, ta, is affected if it directly (or indirectly) depends on a
malicious or an another affected transaction. Two transactions,
ti and tj , are dependent if tj reads an object that has been
updated by ti. Malicious and affected transactions are invalid
transactions, which, if executed, take the database into an
invalid state. Consequently, the integrity and availability of
the CDCs can be affected.
A generic architecture of AIMS, as depicted in Figure 2(a),
contains four components: the IDS, the Admission Controller,
the Response Subsystem, and the Recovery Subsystem. We
assume that existing IDSs can be integrated with AIMS.
Further discussion about IDS is not be provided in this article;
we refer interested readers to [8], [9]. In the following subsec-
tions, we discuss each component in detail. The pseudocode
of the procedures performed by each component is listed in
Algorithm 1.
1) Admission Controller: The main functionality of the
admission controller is to regulate the execution of the transac-
tions. For this purpose, the admission controller checks if the
transaction is requesting to access corrupted objects, which are
stored in the Corrupted Objects Table (COT). In particular, the
admission controller extracts the read/write set, RW , of the
transaction. If RW∩COT is not empty, then the transaction is
blocked until the requested objects are recovered and released
from COT by the recovery subsystem as discussed below.
2) Response Subsystem: The objective of the response sub-
system is to provide an initial evaluation of the damage caused
by a malicious transaction tm in order to prevent incoming
transactions from further spreading the damage. In particular,
IDS alerts the response subsystem when tm is detected as
malicious. Subsequently, the response subsystem collects the
time information about tm, i.e., its commit timestamp tcm and
its detection timestamp tdm. The response subsystem marks all
the objects that have been updated during the period tcm and
tdm by adding them to COT.
3) Recovery Subsystem: The objectives of recovery subsys-
tem are: 1) to identify the correct and complete set of affected
transactions, and 2) to execute the compensating transactions
accordingly. The set of affected transactions is correct and
complete if and only if the set contains no transactions that
are falsely identified as affected and contains every affected
transactions caused by the attack. In order to identify this set,
the recovery subsystem temporarily blocks new transactions
to prevent them from reading any undiscovered corrupted
objects. This subsystem performs blocking operations based
on a locking algorithm. When the lock is acquired by the
recovery subsystem, the admission controller blocks all the
incoming transactions until the recovery subsystem releases
the lock. During the time in which the lock is acquired by the
recovery subsystem, the correct and complete set of affected
transactions is identified. Subsequently, uncorrupted objects
are released from COT.
The recovery procedure is performed in two phases. First,
the recovery subsystem executes compensating transactions to
undo the effect of the malicious and affected transactions.
The recovery subsystem uses the transactions log table to
find the correct version of the corrupted objects. In particular,
the corrupted objects are updated with the values of the
most recent versions before the execution of the malicious
transaction. Second, the recovery subsystem executes compen-
sating transactions to re-execute each transaction in the set of
affected transactions. The information required to re-execute
the transactions is maintained in the transactions log. At the
end of the recovery procedure, the recovered data objects are
removed from COT. Also, the admission controller is signaled
to resume the admission of the blocked transactions.
B. Security-Driven Transactional Database for Cloud Data
Centers
Figure 2(b) shows the modified security-driven architecture
of transactional database for CDCs. The key modification
of the proposed architecture is the redesiging of the Data
Partitioning and Placement Manager (DPPM) in Figure 1(b)
to provide damage containment in the presence of an attack.
The new security-driven DPPM uses information about inter-
transaction dependency to generate an optimal data partition-
ing and placement plan that minimizes the communication
cost and curtails the propagation of damage among tenants.
This information is provided by the Workload Dependency
Assessment (WDA). The objective of WDA is to analyze and
capture the inter-transaction dependencies in the workload.
Note, we only consider data partitioning and placement plans
with no data replication. As a result, a distributed transaction
is divided into sub-transactions, where each sub-transaction
is executed in different data stores. In addition, four new
components are added to the architecture in Figure 1(b) to
perform the functionalities of AIMS, namely, the Distributed
Response and Recovery Manager (DRRM), the Distributed
4ALGORITHM 1: AIMS procedures
1. Function Admission Controller (ti)
2. /* Invoked when a transaction ti is executed
*/
3. RWti ← the read/write objects set ti
4. while RWti ∩ COT do
5. Block ti
6. end
7. Execute ti
8. Function Response Subsystem (tm, tdm)
9. /* Invoked when IDS detects a transaction
tm as malicious */
10. tcm ← get commit time of tm
11. for objects updated between tcm and tdm do
12. Add object to COT
13. end
14. Function Recovery Subsystem (tm)
15. /* Invoked when the response subsystem is
terminated */
16. Block new transactions
17. AT ← Find the complete and correct set of affected transaction
18. Resume new transactions
19. Remove uncorrupted objects from COT
20. Undo tm and all t ∈ AT
21. Redo all t ∈ AT
Admission Controller (DAC), the WDA, and the IDS. The
objective of the DRRM is to coordinate the response and
recovery procedures across the distributed data stores. The
objective of the DAC is to coordinate the admission of
incoming transactions based on the status of aggregated COT
of each data store. Note, the IDS, the DAC, and the WDA
operate at the transaction level, i.e., before a transaction is
divided to multiple sub-transactions, which are routed to their
respective data store. On the other hand, the DRRM operates
at the sub-transaction-level. In essence, the DRRM manages
the response and recovery procedures to recover the corrupted
objects damaged by executing the sub-transactions in each data
store. In the next section, we discuss the security-driven data
partitioning and placement scheme deployed by DPPM.
IV. REENGINEERING CHALLENGE: DATA PARTITIONING
AND PLACEMENT FOR CLOUD DATA CENTER
We perceive that the distributed data stores of CDC can
provide a better damage containment strategy using an in-
telligent data partitioning and placement scheme. Consider
for example a CDC with three data stores, i.e., M1, M2,
and M3, in Figure 3. Let D be the set of objects in the
multi-tenant workload, where Di denotes the data objects of
the ith tenant. Note, D =
⋃
iDi ∪ DS , where DS is the
set of shared data objects among the tenants. Let the set of
transactions executed by the tenants on D be T , which are
executed in the following order {T1, T2, T3, T4, T5, T6, T7}.
A transaction can be classified into two categories: single-
tenant transactions and multi-tenant transactions2. Single-
tenant transactions access data objects belonging to a single
tenant, whereas multi-tenant transactions access shared ob-
jects among tenants and are denoted with T ′. For example,
2https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/sql-database/
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Fig. 3: Pictorial example of data partitioning and placement
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partition.
T ′ = {T4, T6, T7}. Note, T ′ ⊆ T . Refer to the diagram in
the top-left corner of Figure 3. If T6, executed by Tenant 3,
is malicious, then the data of Tenant 4 will be corrupted if
T7 is executed without waiting for the decision of the IDS.
A plausible solution to contain the damage is by employing
a partitioning and placement scheme that splits and places
the data accessed by T6 to M1 and M2. Consequently, T6
becomes a distributed transaction as shown in diagram in the
bottom-right corner of Figure 3. Since the sub-transactions of
a distributed transactions need to be coordinated at the time of
commit, the transaction is held until the IDS declares if it is
a malicious or a benign transaction. Note, a naive solution for
damage containment is to wait for the IDS decision after the
execution of each transaction. However, this can substantially
reduce the transaction throughput for the CDC.
The goal of the data partitioning and placement scheme
is to help in containing the damage caused by malicious
transactions. However, data partitioning can incur some per-
formance degradation as a result in increase in the cost of
communication among distributed data stores. This commu-
nication is incurred due to the delay among data stores [3].
Therefore, we propose a scheme that jointly optimizes the
security and performance goals in terms of data partition-
ing and placement across data stores. Subsequently, we can
formulate the partitioning and placement scheme as a dual-
objective optimization problem with the joint objective to
minimize the communication cost while ensuring damage
containment. Alternatively, the problem can be transformed
into a single-objective optimization problem to minimize the
communication cost of distributed transactions. In this case,
the damage containment is modeled as a constraint function
in the optimization problem that forces a transaction with
5shared data to span multiple data stores. Let St be the span
of transaction t, i.e., the set of data stores that t is accessing
through its sub-transactions. The communication cost of t is
denoted as C(St) and is given as the following.
C(St) = max
e∈(u,v)
u,v∈St,u6=v
`(e) (1)
where `(e) is the value of the label on edge e. In other words,
the communication cost of transaction t accessing the set of
partitions (i.e. data stores) represented by St is the maximum
delay incurred by the communication between any pairs of
data stores. For example, the communication cost of T3 is 90,
since ST3 = {M1,M2} as shown in the graph in the top-right
corner in Figure 3. Accordingly, the optimization problem for
the partitioning and placement scheme of the reengineered
CDC can be given as follows.
Minimize
P∈P
C(St) (2)
subject to
|St′ | > 1 ∀t′ ∈ T ′ (3)
|Pi| ≤ Capacity(Mi) ∀i = 1, . . . , n (4)
Constraint 3 captures the damage containment requirement as
it forces each multi-tenant transaction t′ ∈ T ′ to access at least
two data stores, while constraint 4 ensures that the partitions
can fit into an assigned data store.
V. MALICIOUS TRANSACTION WORKLOAD BENCHMARK
Several benchmarks have been developed in the literature to
evaluate the performance of transactional databases systems,
e.g., TPC-C3. However, no benchmark has been developed
to evaluate the performance of intrusion management in these
systems. To address this challenge, we have developed a novel
malicious transaction workload benchmark4 with the ability to
generate transactional workload with several parameters and
to orchestrate various attack scenarios.
A. Transactional Workload Generation
The proposed benchmark simulates a banking money trans-
fer application. In essence, the benchmark consists of a single
data table, Checking, that has two attributes: account id and
balance. The benchmark has three types of money transfer
transactions: distribute, collect, and many-to-many transfer. A
distribute transaction transfers money from a single account to
N other accounts (a fan-out transaction); a collect transaction
transfers money from M accounts to a single account (a fan-
in transaction); a many-to-many transactions transfers money
from many accounts to many accounts (a fan-in/fan-out trans-
action). A pictorial illustration of these transactions is given
in Figure 4.
The transactional workload is generated using three param-
eters: the number of transactions (n), the degree of fan-in/fan-
out (α), and inter-transaction dependency threshold (β). The
3http://www.tpc.org/tpcc/
4The benchmark is available on https://bitbucket.org/mfelemban/mtb/
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Fig. 4: Types of money transfer transactions.
type of each transaction is chosen as distribute, collect, and
many-to-many, randomly. For each transaction, the degree of
fan-in/fan-out is determined using a uniform distribution with
a range of [2, α] and the amount of transferred money from
the source account is chosen as a percentage of the balance
with uniform distributed range of [0.01,0.1]. To simulate the
transaction inter-dependency, a random graph G of n nodes is
generated using, for example, the Erdo¨s-Renyi model with β
representing the edge dependency probability. Subsequently,
we map the transactions to the nodes in G. Two transactions
are dependent if their respective nodes in G are adjacent. The
data objects are assigned to the transactions such that two
dependent transactions are assigned shared objects.
B. Benchmark Evaluation
The benchmark is implemented on an OLTP-benchmark
testbed [15] and PostgreSQL 9.5. The balance of the accounts
in the Checking table is initially set to $10,000. We evaluate
the performance of AIMS using three metrics: i) number
of affected transactions, ii) average recovery time, and iii)
average response time. The first two metrics indicate the
capability of damage containment, while the third metrics
indicates the availability of the database. We assume that the
IDS has a detection delay of ∆ ms. Table II shows the values
of the parameters used in the experiments. The results are
depicted in Figure 5.
TABLE II: Description of Transactions
Parameter Value
Total number of transactions in the workload 5000
α 0.5
β 10
Transaction arrival rate 10 Txs/sec
In this experiment, we evaluate the performance of AIMS by
choosing 100, 500, and 750 malicious transactions embedded
within the total workload consisting of 5000 transactions. We
study the effect of IDS detection delay. It can be noticed
6from Figure 5(a) that an IDS with poor performance, i.e.,
with a long detection delay, can result a large number of
affected transactions as compared to an IDS with a short
detection delay. The reason is that as the detection delay of
IDS increases, the number of dependent transactions arriv-
ing during the detection period increases. Consequently, the
number of compensating transactions increases which results
in a prolonged average recovery time as depicted in Figure
5(b). Furthermore, a large number of affected transactions
results in registering more data objects in COT. As a result,
the average response time of the transactions in the workload
increases because of the increase in the number of blocked
transactions. The average response time is shown in Figure
5(c). In addition, these figures illustrate that increasing the
number of malicious transactions results in increasing the
number of affected transactions, average response time, and
average recovery time. This is expected since increasing the
intensity of attacks results in more affected transactions which
can lead larger number of corrupted objects. Consequently,
new arriving transactions are more likely to get blocked and
hence results in an increase in the average response time as
depicted in Figure 5(c).
Figure 5 also plots the performance of the reengineered
architecture with a security-driven data partitioning and place-
ment strategy. For this purpose, we solve the optimization
problem given in Equations 3-4 to generate 10 and 20 par-
titions for the data stores using a randomized heuristic. Note,
the optimal solution for this type of partitioning problems
is NP-Complete [3]. In the randomized approach, we have
generated a large number of random solutions and picked
the one that has the smallest value of the objective function.
An important observation can be made that the security-
driven data partitioning and placement strategy reduces the
number of affected transactions and the average recovery
time as we increase the number of partitions from a non-
partitioned case to a case of 10 and 20 partitions, for the same
number of malicious transactions. Note, commit delays are
incurred by all distributed transactions. This delay increases
with the number of partitions. In particular, the commit delays
associated with the distributed malicious transactions results
in the reduction of the number of affected transactions as
mentioned earlier. However, this reduction is achieved at the
cost of increasing the average response time as depicted in
Figure 5(c). Consequently, better results in terms of damage
containment are obtained. On the other hand, as observed in
Figure 5(c) increasing the number of partitions results in larger
communication overhead which subsequently leads longer
average response time. In conclusion, the results show that the
security-driven architecture with AIMS functionality achieves
a trade-off between damage containment and performance. We
expect that an improved solution for the optimization problem
can further improve this trade-off.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the rapid growth of data-intensive applications, the
demand on using secure and efficient cloud data centers
increases. We have proposed a security-driven architecture for
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Fig. 5: Performance results of AIMS using various benchmark-
ing parameters.
multi-tenant distributed transactional database in CDCs. The
proposed architecture integrates the functionalities of a generic
adaptive intrusion management systems with the capability to
detect, respond, and recover from intrusion attacks. Further-
more, we have proposed a security-driven and performance-
driven data partitioning and placement technique to support
multi-tenant workload. Our future work will consider the
impact of various cloud infrastructure aspects, for example
networking and virtualization, on the performance of the dis-
tributed intrusion management. Further study on such aspects
will lead to design CDCs with improved trade-off.
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